

JUN 7 1954

Memorandum of Conference

PRESENT: Admiral Radford, Admiral Carney, General Twining, General Ridgway, General Shepherd, DCI, DCI, 10/1 11 a.m., Saturday, 5 June

SUBJECT: Split Paper on Net Estimates

1. Admiral Radford opened by saying that the Chiefs were personally familiar with the problem and he thought it best if they stated their views individually.
2. Admiral Carney led off reading from and verbally underscoring certain points in a memorandum he had submitted to the Chiefs (copy attached).
3. General Twining expressed his opinion as being roughly in accord with that of Admiral Carney and felt it was simply a question of orderly administrative procedure being preferable to establishing "committees for everything".
4. General Shepherd stated that USMC had no interest in the matter officially and that he was merely present to educate himself.
5. General Ridgway supported previous statements and went on to say that in his opinion whatever organisational arrangement was set up by the President, there would necessarily be the closest collaboration between CIA and the services but that in his view the exercise was essentially a three phase one--the intelligence appreciation, the military war game and finally the estimate of industrial and civilian damage that would result from the net penetration. He felt that CIA had the major role in the first, that the second was exclusively a military problem and that in the third the military with a heavy assist from ODW should do the work.
6. Mr. Dulles underscored his statutory responsibility and the fact that he was speaking for the IAC community and not for CIA. (This really is in response to the obvious misconception expressed by Admiral Carney to the effect that CIA was really a collector of information.) Mr. Dulles further stressed the need for a pragmatic approach rather than abstract discussion of rights and responsibilities and made it clear that the actual working operation would be in his opinion handled by a team headed by a designee of the Chiefs of Staff and by a senior military man such as General Bull to represent CIA. He also asserted that he had no interest in learning detailed war plans or otherwise dealing in operational information except to the extent that the defensive and counter-offensive results we expected to achieve would influence Russian capabilities and choices of courses of action.

This document is part of an integrated  
series of documents which must be  
referred to in their entirety for complete review.

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010007-5

7. There was general agreement that this pragmatic approach was a sound one and that irrespective of which decision the President made, a "marriage" between intelligence and the operating people would have to be close and complete. On the other hand Admiral Radford more than once reverted to his concept that intelligence finishes its work when it turns over an appreciation to the operational planners who then have the prime responsibility for coming up with the over-all estimate.

8. Mr. Dulles made it clear that he was not asking to do anything if it was not properly inescapably within the scope of the duties of the Director of Central Intelligence, that what he was after was responsible participation. He also spoke quite frankly along the lines that this would be a long term advantage to the services in giving them dispassionate and fiscally disinterested assistance in reaching this all important estimate upon which their future request for funds might so largely depend. He stated that the civilians whether in the defense establishment or otherwise on the Council had a tendency to pooh-pooh Russian strength and that some day such an attitude might cause an administration to set limits on military preparedness that would be disastrous to the national security. At about this point Admiral Radford raised the question of NIE 10-3 (Communist Capabilities to Intervene in IndoChina) and stated that he thought it was a crime to permit such "gross estimates" to go to untutored civilians. D/I responded that it was just this kind of evil--of requiring the untutored and overworked senior civilian official of the government to "marry" estimates--that the CIA proposal was intended to deal with. This led to a general discussion and admission by all concerned that we were talking not exclusively about continental defense but about such military problems as IndoChina and even such diplomatic problems as last fall's Trieste crisis. (It was interesting to learn at this point that the Department of State had given the Joint Chiefs of Staff a mere 30 minutes warning of the intended de marche.)

9. General Cabell commented that in his opinion a most important element was the constant injection of intelligence into the problem and into the analysis rather than a single estimate and then abdication of responsibility thereafter by the intelligence community.

10. Admiral Radford announced at the end that the Chiefs would have a meeting to reconsider their paper and would also talk to Mr. Wilson. But there was little indication that they would do anything other than reaffirm their position. On the other hand the entire meeting was most friendly and cordial and it is my personal conclusion that we have in fact promises from the Chiefs to permit our de facto participation fully and virtually without restriction in the exercise whether or not organizational solution A or B is adopted.

25X1A9a

[Redacted]  
Deputy Director/Intelligence

Orig - DCI - ext'd.

Approved For Release 2001/08/08 : CIA-RDP79B00970A000100010007-5  
1 - Chancery

ACB